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Abstract  
We examine whether the probability of having a boy aged below 5 years in households and 
communes is associated with religious individuals in Vietnam using data from the 1999 
Population and Housing Census (on 76 million people) and 2007 Establishment Census (on 
religious establishments). Our results show low probability of having a boy aged below 5 
years among religious households. Moreover, using Vietnam’s 1955–1974 North-South 
division that resulted in different religious developments, we apply a commune-level 
instrumental-variable approach. From this analysis, we find a higher serious follower ratio 
associated with a lower boy ratio within communes and certain non-believer communities. 
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1. Introduction 
The first precept of the five precepts in Buddhism (“Ngũ Giới” in Vietnamese) states, 
“I observe refraining from killing any living beings.” 
 
Similarly, the most important of the five precepts in Taoism (“五戒” in Chinese) indicates 
“No killing.” 
In the Christian Bible, Matthew 5:21 reads, 
 
“You shall not murder; and whoever shall murder shall be in danger of the judgment.” 
 
In this study, it is not our intention to compare beliefs or praise one over another, nor 
do we elevate believers over non-believers in terms of morality. Instead, we investigate 
whether a code of ethics would transfer from one individual to other household members and, 
subsequently, to community members via social interaction. More specifically, we examine 
whether the probability of having a boy under 5 years of age among households having a 
religious individual as head of household would differ from other households and whether 
this would affect how their neighbors behave in terms of sex selection of their children. In 
addition, we test whether loyalty to a code of ethics might result in a lower sex ratio (SR), 
more specifically, the ratio of boys aged 0-4 to corresponding children in the community.  
Our study is motivated by several significant factors. A skewed SR at birth (SSRB) 
has raised major concern across Asian countries, especially among those with larger 
populations. Sen (1990) implied that, globally, there exist more than 100 million fewer 
women than men due to SSRB. While it took decades for the Republic of Korea to return to a 
normal SR at birth (SRB), other Asian countries are experiencing increasing SSRBs, with 
little evidence of an anticipated fall (Guilmoto, 2009). Previous studies (Chen et al., 2013; 
Guilmoto, 2009) have often claimed a son preference and the popularity of ultrasonography 
as the root of the problem. Researchers and policy makers are struggling to search for 
effective ways to reduce and avoid an imbalanced SR, such as legal bans on revealing 
prenatal fetal sex, financial incentives, and laws on gender equality (Das Gupta, 2019).  
The SR may have regional specifics. For example, if examining regional-level data 
for the case of Vietnam, as shown in Graph 1, the SR (as well as religions) would differ in 
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terms of distribution and characteristics. Thus, we argue that relevant research and policies 
should start by tackling issues at the micro level.  
[Insert Graph 1 here] 
However, to the best of our knowledge, no studies have empirically examined the 
connection between religion and SR, especially at the regional and micro levels. The most 
relevant piece of research investigating the correlations between son preference, religion, and 
induced abortion is Chung (2007). Yet, one important issue that remains to be solved is the 
endogeneity of religious characteristics. In addition, the distribution of religions and their 
followers is not random, but rather conducted through paths of historical development. 
Without considering these two important factors, estimations would be biased and difficult to 
claim for a causal relationship.  
We overcome the above issues by using Vietnam’s census data with a unique shock 
that can possibly identify a causal relationship. More specifically, we combine the 1999 
Vietnam Population and Housing Census (hereafter Population Census; representing over 76 
million people) and the 2007 Establishment Census to extract the information on any existing 
religious establishments. We first analyze data at the household level with commune fixed 
effects to identify the differences across religious households, nearby non-believer 
households, and other non-believer households in the same commune. Then, we examine data 
at the commune level (each analysis unit is a commune). We propose three instrumental 
variables (IVs) for the follower density and the ratio of serious followers among all followers. 
Our analyses are based on the natural experiment event, the 1954 Geneva Accords that 
divided Vietnam into two parts, North and South, for 20 years. This division separated the 
development of religions in North and South Vietnam during 1955-1974. Both North and 
South Vietnam had different policies toward religion, and both had religious policies that 
differed from the past.  
Our study reveals some important evidence. At the household level, we found that the 
probability of having a boy under 5 is lower among religious households. The results hold 
even after accounting for commune fixed effects, any combination of sex composition of 
children aged 5-9, the proportion of public workers within the households, variable choices 
for religious households, and even the specifics of each religion. At the commune level, using 
the IV approach, we found that when the serious follower ratio is higher, the corresponding 
probability of having a boy aged 0-4 in the commune is lower. This connection holds true 
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even when the outcome is the probability of non-believer households located in the 
commune. 
Our study also makes several important contributions to the existing body of 
literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on the connections 
between religion and SR using census data. The census data enable us to “zoom in” on the 
regional and micro levels without losing statistical predicting power. Second, our study 
provides a comprehensive analysis at both the household and commune levels and suggests a 
causal mechanism via social interaction between the religious community and the local 
commune. This is possible thanks to our third contribution, the IV approach. Our unique IV 
approach based on the historical development path provides evidence using a rare shock that 
divided a country and its religions. This approach improves the quality of estimation and 
validates the results.  
The remainder of our study is organized as follows. We review the existing literature 
and historical development of religions in Vietnam in Section 2. We describe the data used 
and the main variables in Section 3. We propose and explain our identification strategy in 
Section 4. Then, our results, robustness checks, and interpretation of the mechanisms are 
presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes our study. 
2. Religion, son preference, and sex ratio 
2.1 Sex ratio and son preference 
The United Nations (1958) defines SR as the “ratio of number of one sex to that of the 
other.” In practice, the ratio of males to females is commonly used. However, the reverse for 
children aged 0-6 has also been used in several studies conducted in India. Similarly, the SRB 
is often referred to as the number of boys per 100 girls born in the same cohort collected 
within a period of time in a population. Ideally, the SRB should cover every birth event and 
corresponding child. However, in practice, either small samples or samples counted a long 
time after the date of childbirth are commonly used for calculating the SRB. The former is 
sensitive to location choice, while the latter counts only those children that have survived. 
Therefore, the SR of the latter has become a common proxy for the SRB, assuming that the 
crude death rate should not be statistically different between sexes. The most accurate way to 
find the ideal SRB is probably from a country population census. The least accurate results 
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are derived from cases that use a small sample survey and where no girl was born in the 
cohort. In addition, estimations using survey data for the SR often lack statistical power to 
predict and infer the results of the wider population. 
Meanwhile, due to both economic and social reasons, parents may prefer to have a 
son over a daughter. Prior studies have reviewed possible motives for son preference, such as 
kinship institutions, Confucianism, and income mechanisms (dowries, old age support, wage 
differences, and even land reforms; see Das Gupta et al., 2003; Guilmoto, 2009; Almond et 
al., 2018). Jayachandran (2017) also suggested that a skewed SR (SSR) may be a 
consequence of son preference combined with a low fertility rate. 
The assertion that son preference causes a high SRB conditionally holds if parents can 
identify the sex of the fetus and want a small family size at the same time. If not, the sex of 
the fetus is random for each parity (especially the first; Den Boer & Hudson, 2017), and a 
normal SRB is maintained at the country level. If son-targeting parents can afford an 
unlimited number of children, they will continue to have additional children until they have a 
son. Thus, with each parity, especially at higher levels, the SRB would be skewed. However, 
the aggregated SRB is not skewed as Altindag (2016: p. 544) theoretically proved.  
Son preference can also cause SSR.  If parents cannot identify the sex of the fetus, 
they might engage in postnatal sex selection by committing infanticide or neglecting their 
daughters (i.e., by allocating more resources to sons). As a result, daughters would have a 
lower survival rate. For example, Guilmoto (2009) recorded the few countries in the world, 
namely Nepal, Pakistan, and India, where the mortality rate of girls under the age of 5 far 
exceeded that of boys during 2000-2005. If the sex of the fetus can be revealed, parents may 
even choose prenatal sex selection. However, this is conditional upon their knowledge, access 
to ultrasound devices, cost of detecting sex, abortion, whether parents want to keep the family 
size small (Kashyap & Villavicencio, 2016), and even religion (Guilmoto, 2009). A SSR 
would be accelerated by the availability of ultrasound devices to predict fetal sex (Chen et al., 
2013). 
In practice, the pressure to have a son within a limited number of children and/or 
within a certain period will cause SSR. When the cap on the number of children is small (i.e., 
equal to or less than two), son-targeting individuals have an incentive to manipulate the SRB, 
even at first parity, and cause SSR. The SRB is more skewed if the cost of sex selection is 
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low. In addition, in cultures where it is considered an acceptable norm, polygamy might be 
another way to have a son. 
Various studies have examined whether SSR occurred before the availability of 
ultrasound devices used to predict the sex of the fetus. Using the 1901 Census of India for 
Punjab, West Bengal, and Madras, Chakraborty and Kim (2010) found that the SR varied by 
region, caste, and religion, and they emphasized that SSRB had been occurring for a century. 
Babiarz et al. (2019) examined the SR in China for 1960-1987 and found that it was skewed 
even in the absence of ultrasound devices, which suggests postnatal sex selection. The SSR 
might be worse under the following additional conditions: a) number of children is limited; b) 
ultrasound devices are available and at low-cost; and c) abortion is possible at a low cost.  
Empirical analysis is often challenged by underreported preferences with respect to 
sex (Norling, 2018) and underreported numbers of children/daughters. China during the One 
Child Policy (OCP) period (1978-2015) is a typical example. Goodkind (2011) found that 
Chinese parents underreported their daughters for public data sources, meaning that the actual 
SRB would be different from what was reported. Similarly, Huang et al. (2016) found an 
abnormally high probability of having twins in the Chinese population census, as parents 
registered falsified twins to avoid OCP fines. Sex-selective abortions may also be 
underreported as it is difficult to identify the actual reason for abortions. 
Policy makers focus more at the country level rather than the regional level. However, 
the SR may vary over time. For example, the SR/SRB may vary in Vietnam depending on if 
it is an auspicious year for males/females, as determined by cultural superstitions (Do & 
Phung, 2010). However, calculations at the micro level were less likely considered within the 
previous literature. This is because the population census is not widely available at lower 
divisions of country administration in high frequency. 
Das Gupta (2019) discussed measures to limit SSR and found that bans on revealing 
fetal sex during ultrasound tests are not as effective as other measures. Das Gupta (2019) 
argued that they can defer access to safe reproductive health services. People may take the 
risk of seeking lower quality, but higher cost, illegal services, as seen in Romania, where 
maternal mortality skyrocketed after the bans were implemented (Das Gupta, 2019). In 
addition, despite the bans in China in 1994 and the Republic of Korea in 1987, the SRB 
continued to be skewed (Das Gupta, 2019). Similarly, the financial incentives from public 
funds are also costly and might not work (Anukriti, 2018). Das Gupta (2019) suggested 
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promoting gender equality in a cost-effective way, for example, via media and legislation. 
Das Gupta (2019) also urged policy makers to not wait until society realizes the return value 
of missing women, as in the case of South Korea.  
2.2 Religion, son preference, and sex ratio in Vietnam 
2.2.1 Brief history on the development of religions in Vietnam 
 Before present-day religions such as Buddhism, Catholicism, Protestantism, 
Caodaism, and Hoahaoism became popular in Vietnam, Vietnamese people maintained a 
strong tradition of worshipping ancestors and those whose services were of merit to their 
commune/country (Dang, 1995). Appearing later, three religions/doctrines—Buddhism, 
Taoism, and Confucianism—co-existed well with their traditional religion. Confucianism 
also promoted ancestor veneration, but in the late 19th century, Confucianism lost its power 
along with the fall of the feudal regime (Dang, 1995). The custom of ancestor worship exists 
together with the abovementioned religions. For example, although the Catholic Church 
prohibited this custom, three quarters of Catholics interviewed in Hanoi in 1992 respected 
ancestor worship (Dang, 1995). The Chinese culture has also been absorbed into Vietnam 
through history. For example, having a son to worship the family’s ancestors became 
important since daughters do not remain in the same family after marriage; the paternal line is 
important. Thus, son preference became a part of the common belief system, rather than 
based on an original religious ideology.  
To the best of our knowledge, Buddhism may have come into Vietnam earlier than 
any other current popular religion. It has had a strong historical influence over Vietnamese 
culture. For example, the Dinh Dynasty (968-980) and the Ly Dynasty (1009-1225) 
recognized Buddhism as the state’s religion. Buddhism was absorbed into Vietnamese 
society starting in the north, and it spread with the development of the Vietnamese territory. 
Meanwhile, Islam is more likely linked to the Cham ethnic groups in the south of Vietnam. 
The first arrival of a Christian mission in central Vietnam occurred in 1624, and De 
Rhodes, a French Jesuit, opened a church in Hanoi in 1627 (Vaupot, 2019). Meanwhile, 
Protestants settled in Da Nang in 1911 as part of a mission of the Christian and Missionary 
Alliance (an American organization; Willaime, 2010). In its early days, Catholic 
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development fluctuated, depending on the preferences of Vietnamese emperors1 and support 
from the Paris Foreign Missions Society (in French: “Société des Missions étrangères de 
Paris”) initiated by De Rhodes. 
Formed by a combination of Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism, Caodaism was 
initiated around 1925. Caodaism is located mainly in Tay Ninh province, which shares a 
border with Cambodia (Smith, 1970). Since the first Caodaism followers pursued nationalism 
to remove the French colony’s influence, the religion was restrained in central and northern 
Vietnam (Tran, 1996). These first followers had supported Cuong De, a former Vietnamese 
prince, and were pro-Japan (Tran, 1996). At its peak, the religion even had its own armed 
forces. Thus, its development was not likely to be welcomed due to its potential to endanger 
any later administration once in power.  
Similarly, Hoa Hao (commonly known as Hoa Hao Buddhism) appeared in 1939. Its 
followers were mainly located in the Mekong River Delta near the border with Cambodia. 
After the 1954 Geneva Accords, Hoa Hao was dismantled and was only re-established after 
the fall of the Ngo Dinh Diem administration in South Vietnam in 1963 (Bourdeaux, 2010). 
Illustrations of the development can be found in Appendices 1-5.  
2.2.2 Son preference in Vietnam and religions’ views on abortions 
Haughton and Haughton (1995), Guilmoto (2012), and Vu (2014) have all 
demonstrated that son preference is persistent in Vietnam, with a particular preference for 
one son. Guilmoto (2012) suggested the seriousness of prenatal sex selection and associated 
it with the popularity of ultrasonography after 2000. Explanations for Vietnamese son 
preference are not very different from those in other East Asian countries (Das Gupta et al., 
2003; Vu, 2014).  
Vietnamese laws and policies consistently promote family planning. The Vietnamese 
government promoted family planning and legalized abortion in Decision 162 of the Council 
of Ministers 1988. Abortion is legal nationwide, presumably under Article 44 of the Laws for 
Protecting People’s Heath in 19892. The SSRB and SSR were not observed at the country 
level prior to 2003 (Bélanger et al., 2003), but they were later emphasized by Guilmoto (2009, 
 
1 The emperor of a Confucian state would have viewed Christianity as a threat to power because Christians did 
not accept absolute power, which is the core value of the emperor (Vaupot, 2019). Vaupot (2019) suggested that 
the rejection of Christianity led Napoleon III to execute a military invasion to colonize Vietnam in 1858. 
2 Den Boer and Hudson (2017) recorded that North Vietnam had legalized abortion since 1973. Meanwhile, 
South Vietnam considered it illegal until the reunification. 
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2012). The Vietnamese SSRB received significant public concern, and policy 
recommendations were developed to tackle the issue (Den Boer & Huston, 2017).  
The common value (precept) across the major religions in Vietnam is that killing is a 
sin. Historic canon laws of the Catholic Church (such as Canons 1398 and 1983) are strictly 
against abortion and punish violators with excommunication. Similarly, Buddhism is strongly 
against abortion. Lecso (1987) and Florida (1991) noted that the human being, under the 
concepts of Buddhism, starts when sperm, egg, and consciousness are combined, and thus the 
first precept applies to the fetus. Additionally, to the best of our knowledge, the Vietnamese 
commonly count the number of years of being alive based on the appearance of the fetus for 
the sake of worship.  
Despite rich literature on son preference, SR, SSR, and religion, to the best of our 
knowledge, no study examined the differences among the religious population and the non-
believer population in an interdisciplinary manner, especially with respect to identifying 
possible interactions between the two groups.  
3. Data 
We used two important sources of data. The first is the 1999 Population Census, 
which was conducted on April 1, 1999 by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO) 
and covered a census population of 76,323,173 people. The second is the 2007 Establishment 
Census, also by GSO, from which we extracted information from the section on religious 
establishments (hereafter Religious Establishment). GSO collected information at the 
commune level for all 28,066 religious establishments represented as of June 2007. Religious 
Establishment has information on communes based on location, years of establishment, and 
names. We linked Religious Establishment to Population Census data using the same 
commune identity. We were able to identify a number of religious establishments by specific 
religion and year of establishment for each historical period of time for each commune. 
From the Population Census, we prepared household-level and commune-level data. 
The commune is the third tier of the Vietnamese national administrative division after 
province (61 units) and district (614 units). There were 10,474 communes in 1999. At the 
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household level, from a census of 5,756,416 households having 7,172,242 children aged 0-43 
in 1999, we removed households in which a child aged 0-4 was coded as the household head4 
or their relationship to the household head was missing (5,053 households). We also removed 
those with missing information on education (244,850 households). Finally, we had 
5,506,513 households with a total of 6,817,728 children in 10,474 communes for our 
analysis. At the commune level, we used 7,834 communes for analysis after removing 136 
communes from Quang Tri province5, 1,391 communes with no population observing the six 
main religions mentioned in detail later, and 1,113 communes6 where the religious population 
had no children aged 0-4 in 1999. The statistic descriptions for the two levels of data can be 
found in Appendices 6 and 7. 
We selected all children aged 0-4 and their sexes to calculate some outcomes of 
interest, at either the household or commune level. We calculated the probability of having a 
boy among children aged 0-4 at the commune/household level as the outcome, Prob(b)7. We 
also extracted the denominator and numerator from children of religious households to 
calculate the probability of having a boy among non-believer households in the commune, 
!"#$($2). The age range of 0-4 helps to reduce the issue of the SR varying over time, such 
as due to beliefs about auspicious years for males/females, as suggested by Do and Phung 
(2010). Although !"#$($) cannot distinguish between prenatal and postnatal sex selection, 
the probability captures behaviors on sex selection and can be a proxy for the realized SR. 
In addition, we aggregated years of schooling of people aged 18 and above who were 
residing in the commune/household and computed the mean as a control variable (education). 
For household-level data analyses, we used their corresponding families’ characteristics, such 
as number of generations residing in the household, ratio of public workers to total working 
members, and probability of having a boy aged 5-9.  
The Population Census has important information on the religion of each individual. 
It questions whether an individual follows a specific religion (one of the six main religions). 
 
3 This age cohort most likely lives with their parents. This selection would balance the time trend with respect to 
SR. Focusing on 0-4 years of age also helps to capture differences in tendencies of parents toward and related 
outcomes for each sex, such as different survival rates between males and females. 
4 The children most likely did not have parents/adults living with them or they were orphans. 
5 Quang Tri province lies on the 17th parallel north circle of latitude that divided Vietnam into North and South 
during 1955-1975. We removed the province for the identification strategy using IVs and will provide further 
explanation in the next section. 
6 We applied the same rule when dealing with specific religions. 
7 Prob(boy/children) = number of boys/(number of boys + number of girls). Boys and girls resided in the same 
household/commune. This calculation is better than SR because it can deal with no-girl cases. 
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Then, it asks if the follower actually passed a corresponding formal ritual to be recognized as 
an official follower. For example, in Buddhism, this is represented by “taking refuge” 
(worded “lễ quy y” in Vietnamese in the questionnaires); in Catholicism, it is baptism (“lễ 
rửa tội” in Vietnamese). We used this concept to construct two important variables: follower 
(if an individual followed a religion) and serious follower (if they passed such religious 
rituals)8. The word “serious” has an appropriate meaning because, after the ritual, followers 
had to dedicate themselves to the religion and its precepts. These followers are more likely to 
frequent religious establishments and practice the relevant codes of ethics9 . In contrast, 
followers who did not pass through official rituals are more likely to engage in the above than 
those who do worship/believe but have less access to explanations of codes of ethics, which 
are often provided by monks and priests.  
At the commune level, we classified (()"*#+() ,#--#.)"	0)1(*23  as the ratio of 
(serious) followers over the commune population. 4)"*#+(	,#--#.)"	"52*# is the ratio of 
serious followers to the corresponding total number of followers in each commune. We 
specified this for each of the six main religions (available in the Population Census) in 
Vietnam: Buddhism, Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, Caodaism, and Hoahaoism. At the 
household level, we used the corresponding information of the household head’s religion to 
be representative of the households. We noted that among households with a religious 
individual, only 10.14% of the household heads were non-believers. Additionally, there was 
just one religion followed in each religious household. 
4. Methods 
As noted above, we based our analysis at both the household and commune levels. 
The household level analysis is to depict the statistical differences between families with a 
follower as a household head and those headed by a non-believer. We estimated the 
following reduced form equation using commune fixed effects and clustered robust standard 
errors at the commune level. 
 
8 We defined those who did not declare themselves as a follower of the six most popular religions as non-
believers. However, we acknowledge that they may follow a minor religion not listed in the Population Census. 
9 We noted that “serious” followers are not necessarily monks/priests. For example, the refuge in Buddhism has 
different levels, and the majority of followers do not reach a level as high as a Buddhist monk. For Catholics, 
obviously, most followers do not reach priesthood. 
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(1) !"#$($) = !"#$($#3/8ℎ*-0")1)!" = :#. ")-*<*#1! + :$. 1)5"$3! +
:%. )0+852*#1! + :&. )0+852*#1!
$ + :" . 8#>>+1)" + ?!" 
The ")-*<*#1  dummy variable equals 1 if the head is a follower. The 1)5"$3  dummy 
variable becomes 1 if the household is located near a household with a follower as a 
household head in a subdivision of the commune (in Vietnamese: “tổ dân phố”/ “cụm”/ 
“thôn”/ “xóm”/ “ấp”/ “khóm”) and if none of the household members are religious 
individuals. @)5"$3  indicates the proximity difference to that of the household with a 
religious head. We also use specific religions by constructing six dummies corresponding to 
the six popular religions found in Population Census. 
The estimation of Equation (1) can control for all time-invariant factors within a 
commune (average area is about 31.62 km2), including access to health care, infrastructure, 
quality of education system, and availability of religious services. However, the downside of 
Equation (1) is that religion is an endogenous variable. Religion might be associated with 
some specific characteristics of the households that also determine whether parents engaged 
in sex selective measures. The location distribution of followers’ residence is also 
endogenous. Followers may have flocked to a certain area (shown in Appendices 3-5) rather 
than randomly moving to different parts of the country. Therefore, we used a commune level 
analysis with an IV approach.  
In an IV approach, similar to Equation (1), we estimated the following equation at the 
commune level in the second stage: 
(2) !"#$($) = !"#$($#3/8ℎ*-0")1)' = A#(. ")-*<*#1'( + A$. )0+852*#1' +
A%. )0+852*#1'^2 + C'. 
We used the proportion of the commune population to the country population to 
derive a weight (p-weight) for each commune in any estimation at the commune level. We 
used two specifications: A and B 10  for ")-*<*#1'( . We used ,#--#.)"	0)1(*23  and 
()"*#+(	,#--#.)"	0)1(*23	at the commune level for specification A (Spec. A, hereafter). 
Meanwhile, we used ()"*#+(	,#--#.)"	"52*#	 for specification B (Spec. B, hereafter). 
D#--#.)"	0)1(*23  suggests a scaled association, while ()"*#+(	,#--#.)"	0)1(*23  and 
 
10 In addition, we used !"#$($2) to validate the presence of an existing association between "()*+*#, and the 
outcomes of the non-believer group.  
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()"*#+(	,#--#.)"	"52*# denote the quality/seriousness of practicing the religious code of 
ethics. 
Since ")-*<*#1'(  is endogenous, we used IVs in the first stage for the following 
reduced form equation: 
(3) F)-*<*#1'( = G#(. #-0'( 	+ 	G$(. 1#"2ℎ17'( 	+ 	G%(. (#+2ℎ17'( + θ' .	
K-0'(	 is the density of religious establishments set up prior to 1955 per 1,000 people of 
commune L based on the population in 1999. Similarly, 1#"2ℎ17/(#+2ℎ17 is the density of 
religious establishments built between 1955 and 1974 in North/South Vietnam per 1,000 
people of the commune. We noted that whenever 1#"2ℎ17' takes any value other than zero, 
(#+2ℎ17' is zero for the observed commune, and vice versa. This is because every commune 
is located in either North or South Vietnam.  
We have several arguments to support the choice of IVs. First, religions can influence 
the probability of having a boy through their religious establishments and symbols. They can 
also influence broader household behaviors through their followers and social activities. The 
religious establishments existed before the birth of any children aged 0-4, and parents have 
no influence over their existence. This is because all establishments were built before 1975. 
In 1974, in order for parents to have influence over a newly built religious establishment, 
they would have had to be over 18 years old. Those who met this condition would be over 44 
years of age by 1999. However, 95% of parents11 with children aged 0-4 were 44 years of age 
or younger in 1999. It is less likely that an existing commune characteristic decided both the 
probability of having a boy and the existence of a religious establishment. Therefore, the 
reverse causality, that is, from the parents to the religious establishment, is extremely 
unlikely. From the head of the household (or the religious member), the influence of religion 
transmits to the parents through interactions with the head of the household (religious 
member) thanks to their bargaining power based on economic status and family relations. 
However, we acknowledge that a religious head/member whose age was above 44 in 1999 
might have had an impact on the decisions to both select the sex of the child via their parents 
and to build a religious establishment during 1955-1974. 
 
11 We calculated the age of the household heads who had a child aged 0-4 in the Population Census. Only 5% of 
them were over 42, if counting only females. 
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Second, the event of the 17th parallel north to divide Vietnam into North and South 
based on the 1954 Geneva Accords is a (natural experiment) shock. The decision was made 
in Geneva, Switzerland, based on negotiations that took place from April 26 to July 20, 1954; 
the decision was outside the control of the majority of Vietnamese commoners who were 
great-grandparents, grandparents, or parents of children aged 0-4 in 1999. Before the Accords, 
the religions may have developed at similar paces in northern and southern Vietnam, 
although closer to 1954, the number of religious establishments accelerated in the south (see 
Appendix 1). After the Geneva Accords, the country witnessed a mass flow (about 600,000 
or 65%) of North Vietnam’s Catholic followers moving to South Vietnam (Vaupot, 2019)12. 
The difference between North and South also caused chaos at the grassroots level among 
followers. In North Vietnam, in general, land belonged to the state in 1959, while private 
ownership of land was maintained in South Vietnam. Therefore, having a new establishment 
would have become more difficult in the North. Meanwhile, with the influx of followers, the 
demand for religious establishments would have increased, as shown in Graph 2 (or in 
Appendix 1).  
[Insert Graph 2 here] 
In North Vietnam, the National Front, a main wing of the Communist Party, united all 
kinds of religions under their aim “for national salvation”. For example, Willaime (2010) 
noted that the North Protestant Mission statutes read, “[The] Protestant mission is to teach 
believers in patriotism…in respect to people’s authorities and under the laws of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam.” The North also promoted atheism and loyalty to 
communism. For example, to be a communist, the person had to swear to be loyal to 
communist ideologies. Therefore, the differences between old religious establishments and 
other newly established ones during 1955-1974 would be material. Meanwhile, in South 
Vietnam, during 1955-1963, under the Ngo Dinh Diem’s administration, the Catholic 
community developed quickly and absorbed people who wanted to be loyal to the 
administration (SNIE, 1963). Meanwhile, other religions (e.g. Buddhism, Caodaism, and 
Hoahaoism) were oppressed and faced challenges such as the Buddhist crisis in 1963 
(Willaime, 2010). Therefore, the religious establishments (including their locations) built 
during 1955-1974 might also differ from older religious establishments. More importantly, 
 
12 Pope Pius XII issued a decree in 1949 that prohibited Catholics from following communism (Vaupot, 2019). 
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these establishments historically recorded what happened in the commune in the 
corresponding time and reflected the differences among religions. 
As the 17th parallel north overlapped with the present day Quang Tri province, we 
followed Miguel and Roland (2011) and excluded all communes of Quang Tri to validate the 
results using IVs. The statistical figures support our arguments. The correlations among the 
three IVs are small—0.0837 between #-0 and 1#"2ℎ17; 0.0327 between #-0 and (#+2ℎ17; 
and -0.0565 between 1#"2ℎ17  and (#+2ℎ17 . Other evidence can be clearly observed in 
Graph 2 and Appendices 3-5. 
Finally, for robustness checks, we examine specific religions and household 
characteristics, such as the proportion of household members working for the public sector 
and whether households included any children aged 5-9, in further detail. The analysis by 
specific religion supports the validity of the use of IVs, major influences, and meaningful 
interpretations. Meanwhile, Decision 162 of the Vietnamese Council of Ministers pertaining 
to the two-child limit was still valid in 1999 for all communists, civil servants, military staff, 
and residents in urban areas and some specific regions (Den Boer & Hudson, 2017). This was 
an important motive for parents to target a son within the two-child limit. However, Bélanger 
et al. (2003) reported a normal Vietnamese SR for the first parity before 2003. Therefore, the 
probability might be conditional to the probability of having a boy among elder children.  
5. Results 
5.1 Probability of having a boy at the household level and neighborhood differences 
As seen in Table 1, we found that the probability of having a boy among children 
aged 0-4 is lower among households whose head is a religious individual. This result holds 
true even after controlling for all time-invariant factors related to the commune. The time-
invariant factors include availability and (perhaps) access to health care, infrastructure, and 
commune customs. The difference is robust, about 0.2 percentage points lower in probability, 
even when we compared households where a member is a follower with a non-believer 
household within the same commune. When delving into specific religions, we found the 
difference varied by religion and was most statistically significant for Catholic and Protestant 
households. In addition, the sign of coefficients is consistent regardless of the definition of a 
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religious household and the scale of followers within the household (either by religion of the 
head/member or the ratio of followers to household members). 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
We found a negative sign for 1)5"$3	1#1 − $)-*)N)"	ℎ#+()ℎ#-0, representing those 
located nearby within the same subdivision of the commune. These variables are statistically 
insignificant; however, we noted that the corresponding p-values were 0.14-0.15. One might 
argue that a religious household’s residential location might coincide with where the 
probability of having a boy is low. We acknowledge that the difference in characteristics 
between religious and non-believer households might lead to both the decision to become a 
follower and the decision to pursue a son(s). We further test this when using IVs for 
")-*<*#1. 
We attempted to divide the population of households with children aged 0-4 
according to two important characteristics: having public workers as household members and 
having children aged 5-9. Parents working in the public sector would face harsh punishment 
for violating the two-children limit (Decision 162 of the Council of Ministers in 1988). Thus, 
they have greater incentive to engage in sex selection. They may also have had more access 
to information and health care compared with other parents. 
However, even when selecting only households with at least one public worker, the 
difference is still 0.29 percentage points lower, slightly lower than that of the full sample 
estimations, for households with a religious head (see Appendix 11). The signs are negative 
for each religion-specific specification, but they are statistically insignificant. In addition, the 
difference is minor if the households did not have children aged 5-9 (Appendix 12). This 
result agrees with previous literature that reflected a SSR at the first birth (Bélanger et al., 
2003) was least likely. However, the difference nearly doubles with the presence of at least 
one child aged 5-9 (Appendix 13).  
In addition, the differences found among households with no members working in the 
public sector match the previous population selection (see Appendix 8). We note that this 
sample selection represented 84.78% of households. The difference between nearby non-
believer households and other non-believer households located farther away from the 
religious household became statistically significant, as shown in Column 3 of Appendix 8. 
The results are consistent even when we further divide the households into those with 
children aged 5-9 and those without (Appendices 9-10). 
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5.2 Probability of having a boy across communes 
We applied a simple OLS estimation for communes and used ratios of commune 
population over country population as weights. The results indicate consistent and negative 
signs for ()"*#+(	,#--#.)"	0)1(*23  (except for O52ℎ#-*8*(> ), as shown in Table 2. 
However, we acknowledge that the two variables for religion are endogenous. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Therefore, we used the IV approach to instrument the endogenous variables using the 
number of religious establishments (in three cases) divided into the 1999 commune 
population. These figures include those established by the 1954 Geneva Accords and those 
set up during 1955-1974 for North and South Vietnam, separately. The second stage is shown 
in Table 3, while the first stage results can be found in Appendix 14. In addition to analyzing 
all communes as a group, we can apply the IV approach for communes with Buddhist and 
Catholic communities. Buddhism and Catholicism were the largest and most popular 
religions in Vietnam in 1999.  Muslim, Cao Dai, and Hoa Hao communities only developed 
in specific communes in the South, making a similar IV approach impossible. Similarly, 
Protestant establishments did not have enough variation in the North after the Geneva 
Accords. In addition, post-IV estimation tests strongly support the statistical validity of the 
IVs used, as shown in Table 3. 
In the first stage, the positive correlation is straightforwardly interpretable. The 
density of current followers was high where there were many religious establishments. The 
negative (and insignificant) coefficient of P+"*1<	1955 − 74	(@#"2ℎ)	in Columns (1), (3), 
and (7) of Appendix 14 can be explained as follows. Hanoi attempted to put all religions into 
a solidarity block for national salvation and was very likely successful with Buddhism. There 
may be state-backed Buddhist establishments in the North, and thus it is not necessary to 
have a positive correlation with follower density. It can even lead to a statistically lower 
follower density. However, those residing in these communes might be the “survival” 
followers or, more likely, serious Buddhism followers. This did not happen with Catholic 
followers because the communities were loyal to the Vatican. In addition, P+"*1<	1955 −
74	(4#+2ℎ17) showed a negative sign and was statistically significant in Columns (4), (7), 
and (8) of Appendix 14. We note that the Buddhist community in the South was rooted in the 
Unified Buddhist Sangha of Vietnam (in Vietnamese: “Giáo hội Phật giáo Việt Nam Thống 
nhất,” established in 1963), while those in the North belonged to the Buddhist Sangha of 
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Vietnam (in Vietnamese: “Giáo hội Phật giáo Việt Nam,” the uniquely-recognized-by-
concurrent-government association, established in 1981). Where the number of southern 
Buddhist establishments increased during 1955-1974, their followers were likely loyal to the 
Unified Buddhist Sangha of Vietnam. Buddhists may have remained divided after the 
reunification in 1975. The existing followers in 1974 may also resist or be reluctant to accept 
official rituals by the Buddhist Sangha of Vietnam. In addition, we acknowledge that serious 
followers might have migrated during 1975-1999 either within the country or abroad, which 
would have caused different signs of the coefficients. However, since the establishments 
remain where they were historically, they would have accommodated such correlations.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 3 illustrates the outcomes for the communes. The results for Spec. A showed 
that a 1% increase in ()"*#+(	,#--#.)"	0)1(*23  is associated with a 0.0981 percentage 
point lower probability of having a boy among households with children aged 0-4 in the 
commune. The sign of ,#--#.)"	0)1(*23 is positive and statistically significant; however, 
the two variables of religion have high statistical correlation and may have caused multi-
collinearity. Therefore, we had to rely on Spec. B for the most reliable statistical results.   
The results for Spec. B (Table 3) clearly indicate a negative correlation between 
()"*#+(	,#--#.)"	"52*#  and the probability of having a boy among households with 
children aged 0-4 in the commune. If ,#--#.)"	0)1(*23 were approximately 1, the results in 
Table 3 would be considered self-explanatory and straightforward. For example, if followers 
are the least likely to engage in sex selection, the more likely they are to flock to the 
commune, and the lower the commune SR becomes. However, we note that the average 
serious follower density was under 12% in 1999 (see Appendix 7). Therefore, we extended 
the analyses to the probability of having a son among non-believer households, as shown in 
Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The results in Table 4 indicate a strong association between religion and the 
probability of having a boy among non-believer households located in the commune in Spec. 
B. A 1% increase in the serious follower ratio is associated with a 0.0177 percentage point 
lower probability of having a boy among non-believer households residing in the same 
commune (Column 8, Table 4). The results are consistent between the overall results 
(Column 8) and Buddhism (Column 10). However, we could not find a reliable and 
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statistically significant association with Catholicism. We speculate that this is perhaps due to 
the specific characteristics of the religion. More precisely, the ratio of serious Catholic 
followers was always high and close to 1 and probably holds the least variation across the 
communes. 
5.3 Robustness checks, possible mechanisms, and discussions 
5.3.1 Are both follower density and serious follower ratio important? 
We acknowledge that separating ,#--#.)"	0)1(*23 and “seriousness” is important 
but practically difficult to accomplish13. Although Spec. B is statistically more reliable than 
Spec. A, Spec. B fails to account for the scale of the follower community. Therefore, we tried 
to examine two cases, “low” and “high” ,#--#.)"	0)1(*2314, according to the distribution 
shown in Table 5.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
We found ()"*#+(	,#--#.)"	"52*#  to be important and consistent with the full 
sample selection (see Table 5) for both outcomes used (i.e., !"#$($) and !"#$($2)). The 
answer for the question 5.3.1 would be yes. In the general case (Columns 1, 2, 7, and 8), 
()"*#+(	,#--#.)"	"52*#  is more pronounced among low follower density communes. 
Meanwhile, in the case of Buddhism (Columns 3, 4, 9, and 10), the ratio is more pronounced 
for high Buddhism follower density communes. 
5.3.2 Can understanding and pursuing codes of ethics transfer to the local 
community? 
 We have shown that in a household with either a religious household head or member, 
the probability of having a boy aged 0-4 in 1999 is lower than that in non-believer 
households. The results suggest that the exercise of ethics would transfer from one individual 
to another within a household. We also found that non-believer households located in 
geographic proximity to a religious household have a slightly lower boy ratio, with only a 
0.14-0.15 error probability. Using an IV approach, after statistically adjusting for the 
endogenous religion variable(s) by the number of establishments in different historical 
periods divided by the 1999 commune population, ()"*#+(	,#--#.)"	"52*#  would be 
 
13 Ideally, this is possible if there is a natural experiment shock that holds one factor constant while letting 
another factor fluctuate. However, such a shock would be rare. 
14 We chose half of the number of communes based on follower density distribution (50% lowest and 50% 
highest, separately) and repeated the IV-approach estimations. 
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associated with a lower boy ratio for the commune, even with non-believer households 
residing in the commune. 4)"*#+(	,#--#.)"	"52*# implies the proportion of followers who 
had learnt and met certain conditions or passed ethics code tests. This variable holds its 
importance even among communes with a low follower density. Therefore, this evidence 
might suggest a transfer from religious precepts to followers, from followers to members 
within the same family, and from followers to the local community.  
5.3.3 Is it just the transmission of ethics codes? 
In the original data, the 28,066 religious establishments included religious charity 
organizations, orphanages, and organizations supporting the disabled, homeless, and elderly. 
Thus, the transfer mechanism might not be just codes of ethics but also other social 
interaction activities in the local community, although the number of these kinds of activities 
is limited. 
6. Conclusions 
In this study, we examined whether the difference in the probability of having a boy 
aged 0-4 in a household/commune could be associated with religious factors. We found that 
religious households have a lower probability of having a boy compared with non-believer 
households.  A high serious follower ratio in a commune is linked with a lower probability of 
having a boy in the commune, including non-believer households in certain cases. Our results 
suggest that the codes of ethics would transfer from person to person within the household, 
from household members to outsiders, and perhaps further to the local non-believer 
community. 
However, we also acknowledge several drawbacks of this study, which provide 
directions for future research. First, we were only able to analyze two specific religions, 
Buddhism and Catholicism, and were unable to have a similarly viable approach for the 
others. We were also unable to deal with unrecognized and unrecorded religions (i.e., 
Confucianism) in the Population Census, as well as those that never existed in Vietnam. 
Thus, our findings may be country bound. Second, we did not identify an ideal identification 
strategy to distinguish between the scale effect (0)1(*23	#,	,#--#.)") and quality effect 
( ()"*#+(	,#--#.)"	"52*# ). Third, we had to assume only minor internal/international 
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migration between 1975 and 1999, in line with Miguel and Roland (2011). Finally, we were 
unable to measure superstition and distinguish it from more formal religious followership. 
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APPENDIX 1. DISTRIBUTION BY YEAR OF RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT  
(1904-1974) 
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APPENDIX 2. DISTRIBUTION BY YEAR OF RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT  
PRIOR TO 2007 
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APPENDIX 3. NUMBER OF BUDDHIST ESTABLISHMENTS BY SET-UP TIMELINE 
 
Prior to Geneva Accords    After Geneva Accords until 1974 
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APPENDIX 4. NUMBER OF CATHOLIC ESTABLISHMENTS BY SET-UP TIMELINE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Prior to Geneva Accords    After Geneva Accords until 1974 
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APPENDIX 5. NUMBER OF PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENTS BY SET-UP 
TIMELINE 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prior to Geneva Accords    After Geneva Accords until 1974 
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APPENDIX 6. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AMONG HOUSEHOLDS HAVING 
CHILDREN AGED 0-4 BY RELIGIOUS STATUS OF HOUSEHOLD HEAD 
  Head as non-believer Head as religious follower 
  Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
A-All households 
Prob(b) 0.5204 0.4720 0 1 0.5185 0.4681 0 1 
Two-generation 
household 
0.6201 0.4854 0 1 0.5648 0.4958 0 1 
Three-generation 
household 
0.3371 0.4727 0 1 0.3987 0.4896 0 1 
More than three-
generation 
0.0428 0.2023 0 1 0.0365 0.1876 0 1 
Household size 5.0990 1.9970 2 41 5.6568 2.3309 2 40 
Household education  7.3847 2.6132 0 20 6.4493 2.4887 0 20 
Number of households 4,390,890       1,115,623       
 
B-Household with public worker 
Prob(b) 0.5203 0.4811 0 1 0.5192 0.4731 0 1 
Two-generation 
household 
0.4424 0.4967 0 1 0.2875 0.4526 0 1 
Three-generation 
household 
0.4964 0.5000 0 1 0.6510 0.4766 0 1 
More than three-
generation 
0.0612 0.2396 0 1 0.0615 0.2402 0 1 
Household size 5.2182 2.2460 2 41 6.3885 2.8841 2 40 
Household education  9.7110 2.6218 1 20 8.5553 2.5089 1 20 
Ratio of members 
working for public sector 
over total working 
members 
0.6456 0.3015 0.0370 1 0.5561 0.2915 0.04 1 
Number of households 698,128    139,843    
 
C-Among B-households having children aged 5-9  
Prob(b) 0.5205 0.4837 0 1 0.5176 0.4729 0 1 
Two-generation 
household 
0.4536 0.4978 0 1 0.2917 0.4545 0 1 
Three-generation 
household 
0.4865 0.4998 0 1 0.6506 0.4768 0 1 
More than three-
generation 
0.0599 0.2373 0 1 0.0577 0.2332 0 1 
Household size 5.8990 2.4283 3 41 7.3128 3.1406 3 40 
Household education 9.5028 2.6592 1 20 8.3163 2.5162 1 18 
Ratio of members 
working for public sector 
over total working 
members 
0.6181 0.2981 0.0370 1 0.5365 0.2874 0.052
6 
1 
Ratio of boys over total 
number of children aged 
5-9 
0.4777 0.4792 0 1 0.4979 0.4678 0 1 
Number of households 276,396    58,351    
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APPENDIX 7. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR COMMUNES FOR IV ANALYSIS 
 North    South    
 Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Prob(b) 0.5120 0.0233 0.3600 0.5980 0.5150 0.0199 0.4046 0.6090 
Follower density  0.1035 0.1655 0.0001 0.9933 0.2673 0.2656 0.0004 0.9916 
Serious follower density 0.0854 0.1436 0 0.9923 0.1145 0.1616 0 0.9780 
Serious follower ratio 0.7926 0.2537 0 1 0.4374 0.2475 0 1 
Household education 7.9160 1.0343 3.1861 11.0853 6.3696 1.1636 3.1991 10.0796 
Density of religious 
establishments per 1,000 people 
        
  Before 1955 (Old) 0.2800 0.4802 0 6.3425 0.1453 0.2314 0 1.7509 
  During 1955-1974 (North17) 0.0171 0.0798 0 1.42225     
  During 1955-1974 (South17)     0.1008 0.1735 0 2.2733 
Number of communes 4,151    3,683    
Note: All communes had at least one child aged 0-4 and a follower; Quang Tri province is excluded.  
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APPENDIX 8. HOUSEHOLDS WITH NO PUBLIC WORKERS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) 
Head as religious follower –0.0024*** –0.0022*** 
 
  
 
(0.0007) (0.0007) 
 
  
Any member as follower   –0.0019***   
   (0.0007)   
Nearby non–believer 
household 
–0.0011 –0.0011 –0.0011* –0.0010 –0.0011 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Buddhism    –0.0006 –0.0003 
    (0.0009) (0.0011) 
Catholicism    –0.0044*** –0.0043*** 
    (0.0010) (0.0011) 
Protestantism    –0.0082*** –0.0102*** 
    (0.0030) (0.0032) 
Islam    0.0031 0.0058 
    (0.0069) (0.0074) 
Caodaism    0.0016 0.0030 
    (0.0023) (0.0030) 
Hoahaoism    0.0022 0.0031 
    (0.0028) (0.0029) 
Dummies for generations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of communes 10,474 10,474 10,474 10,474 10,474 
Observations 4,668,542 4,668,542 4,668,542 4,668,542 4,668,542 
R–squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Note: Same as Table 1. 
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APPENDIX 9. HOUSEHOLDS WITH NO PUBLIC WORKERS AND NO CHILDREN 
AGED 5-9 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) 
Head as religious follower –0.0019* –0.0018* 
 
  
 
(0.0010) (0.0010) 
 
  
Any member as follower   –0.0020**   
   (0.0009)   
Nearby non–believer 
household 
–0.0011 –0.0011 –0.0011 –0.0011 –0.0011 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Buddhism    –0.0006 –0.0010 
    (0.0013) (0.0015) 
Catholicism    –0.0037** –0.0037** 
    (0.0014) (0.0015) 
Protestantism    –0.0196*** –0.0218*** 
    (0.0047) (0.0050) 
Islam    0.0180* 0.0213** 
    (0.0100) (0.0101) 
Caodaism    0.0043 0.0067 
    (0.0032) (0.0043) 
Hoahaoism    0.0024 0.0021 
    (0.0039) (0.0042) 
Dummies for generations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of communes 10,474 10,474 10,474 10,474 10,474 
Observations 2,407,199 2,407,199 2,407,199 2,407,199 2,407,199 
R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Note:  Same as Table 1. 
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APPENDIX 10. HOUSEHOLDS WITH NO PUBLIC WORKERS BUT WITH CHILDREN 
AGED 5-9 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) 
Head as religious follower –0.0027*** –0.0025** 
 
  
 
(0.0011) (0.0011) 
 
  
Any member as follower   –0.0017*   
   (0.0010)   
Nearby non–believer 
household 
–0.0010 –0.0010 –0.0011 –0.0009 –0.0010 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Buddhism    –0.0007 0.0005 
    (0.0014) (0.0016) 
Catholicism    –0.0048*** –0.0046*** 
    (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Protestantism    –0.0010 –0.0031 
    (0.0038) (0.0042) 
Islam    –0.0035 –0.0005 
    (0.0087) (0.0090) 
Caodaism    –0.0021 –0.0018 
    (0.0035) (0.0045) 
Hoahaoism    0.0014 0.0040 
    (0.0043) (0.0045) 
Ratio boy aged 5-9/ –0.0164*** –0.0164*** –0.0164*** –0.0164*** –0.0164*** 
Children aged 5-9 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Dummies for generations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of communes 10,473 10,473 10,473 10,473 10,473 
Observations 2,261,343 2,261,343 2,261,343 2,261,343 2,261,343 
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Note:  Same as Table 1. 
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APPENDIX 11. HOUSEHOLDS WITH PUBLIC WORKERS  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) 
Head as religious follower –0.0029* –0.0029* 
 
  
 
(0.0017) (0.0018) 
 
  
Any member as follower   –0.0027   
   (0.0016)   
Nearby non–believer 
household 
0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0011 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
Buddhism    –0.0026 –0.0028 
    (0.0021) (0.0025) 
Catholicism    –0.0040 –0.0039 
    (0.0029) (0.0031) 
Protestantism    –0.0111 –0.0060 
    (0.0079) (0.0089) 
Islam    –0.0017 0.0003 
    (0.0298) (0.0332) 
Caodaism    0.0048 0.0045 
    (0.0067) (0.0098) 
Hoahaoism    0.0030 0.0112 
    (0.0095) (0.0111) 
Ratio of public workers/ 0.0002 0.0011 0.0011 0.0010 0.0011 
Working members (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
Dummies for generations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of communes 10,471 10,471 10,471 10,471 10,471 
Observations 837,971 837,971 837,971 837,971 837,971 
R-squared 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
Note:  Same as Table 1. 
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APPENDIX 12. HOUSEHOLDS WITH PUBLIC WORKERS AND NO CHILDREN 
AGED 5-9 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) 
Head as religious follower –0.0020 –0.0020 
 
  
 
(0.0023) (0.0023) 
 
  
Any member as follower   –0.0014   
   (0.0022)   
Nearby non–believer 
household  
0.0022 0.0022 0.0022 0.0023 0.0022 
 (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
Buddhism    –0.0020 –0.0018 
    (0.0028) (0.0033) 
Catholicism    –0.0026 –0.0028 
    (0.0038) (0.0041) 
Protestantism    –0.0095 –0.0030 
    (0.0121) (0.0137) 
Islam    0.0357 0.0418 
    (0.0540) (0.0620) 
Caodaism    0.0028 0.0045 
    (0.0086) (0.0125) 
Hoahaoism    0.0045 0.0143 
    (0.0114) (0.0133) 
Ratio of public workers/ 0.0015 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 
Working members (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) 
Dummies for generations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of communes 10,448 10,448 10,448 10,448 10,448 
Observations 503,224 503,224 503,224 503,224 503,224 
R-squared 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 
Note:  Same as Table 1. 
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APPENDIX 13. HOUSEHOLDS WITH PUBLIC WORKERS AND CHILDREN AGED 5-9 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) 
Head as religious follower –0.0046* –0.0046* 
 
  
 
(0.0027) (0.0027) 
 
  
Any member as follower   –0.0049*   
   (0.0026)   
Nearby non–believer 
household  
–0.0006 –0.0007 –0.0005 –0.0006 –0.0007 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Buddhism    –0.0038 –0.0049 
    (0.0034) (0.0040) 
Catholicism    –0.0061 –0.0062 
    (0.0042) (0.0046) 
Protestantism    –0.0132 –0.0093 
    (0.0104) (0.0125) 
Islam    –0.0194 –0.0192 
    (0.0375) (0.0397) 
Caodaism    0.0057 0.0019 
    (0.0108) (0.0155) 
Hoahaoism    –0.0006 0.0047 
    (0.0167) (0.0195) 
Ratio of boys aged 5-9/ –0.0066*** –0.0066*** –0.0066*** –0.0066*** –0.0066*** 
Children aged 5-9 (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
Ratio of public workers/ –0.0024 –0.0011 –0.0011 –0.0011 –0.0011 
Working members (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) 
Dummies for generations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of communes 10,446 10,446 10,446 10,446 10,446 
Observations 334,747 334,747 334,747 334,747 334,747 
R-squared 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 
Note:  Same as Table 1. 
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APPENDIX 14. FIRST STAGES OF IV ANALYSIS 
 Spec. A Spec. B 
 All  Buddhism  Catholicism  All Buddhism Catholicism 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Follower 
density  
Serious 
follower 
density 
Follower 
density  
Serious 
follower 
density 
Follower 
density  
Serious 
follower 
density 
Serious 
follower ratio 
Serious 
follower ratio 
Serious 
follower ratio 
Religious establishment 
density 
         
   Before 1955 (Old) 0.0365*** 0.0224*** 0.0764*** 0.0227*** 0.4000*** 0.4023*** 0.0598*** 0.2832*** 0.1592*** 
 
(0.0082) (0.0060) (0.0140) (0.0022) (0.0191) (0.0095) (0.0084) (0.0211) (0.0095) 
   During 1955-74 (North17) –0.0541 0.0662*** –0.2214*** 0.0194*** 0.6044*** 0.6073*** 0.4299*** 0.9948*** 0.2271*** 
 
(0.0406) (0.0412) (0.0277) (0.0090) (0.1163) (0.1162) (0.0500) (0.1132) (0.0290) 
   During 1955-74 (South17) 0.3230*** 0.1220*** 0.3202*** –0.0435*** 0.9335*** 0.9293*** –0.4024*** –0.6563*** 0.2303*** 
 (0.0304) (0.0199) (0.0590) (0.0065) (0.0803) (0.0801) (0.0330) (0.0504) (0.0197) 
Observations 7,834 7,834 6,547 6,547 6,481 6,481 7,834 6,547 6,481 
Centered R2 0.1072 0.0296 0.0791 0.0902 0.2267 0.2308 0.2504 0.1647 0.0626 
Uncentered R2 0.4848 0.3424 0.4076 0.4309 0.4168 0.4143 0.8446 0.6455 0.9798 
Test for excluded instruments          
     Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: Educational variables are included in all estimations. 
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GRAPH 1. SEX RATIO, FOLLOWER DENSITY, SERIOUS FOLLOWER RATIO, AND 
RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT 
 
Note: All country shape files used in this study are from the GADM database (https://gadm.org) for the current 
administration division of 63 provinces, while there were only 61 provinces in 1999. Therefore, the maps 
display some “missing” data. 
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GRAPH 2. NUMBER OF RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS IN 2007 
 
All (as of 2007)        Prior to Geneva Accords   After Geneva Accords until 1974 
Note: The figure does not reflect establishments that were no longer in existence by 2007.
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TABLE 1. PROBABILITY OF HAVING A BOY AMONG HOUSEHOLDS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) 
Head as religious follower –0.0026*** –0.0025*** 
 
  
 
(0.0007) (0.0007) 
 
  
Any member as follower   –0.0021***   
   (0.0006)   
Nearby non–believer 
household 
–0.0009 –0.0009 –0.0009 –0.0008 –0.0009 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Buddhism    –0.0011 –0.0008 
    (0.0009) (0.0010) 
Catholicism    –0.0046*** –0.0044*** 
    (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Protestantism    –0.0088*** –0.0099*** 
    (0.0027) (0.0030) 
Islam    0.0031 0.0056 
    (0.0072) (0.0077) 
Caodaism    0.0019 0.0029 
    (0.0021) (0.0029) 
Hoahaoism    0.0018 0.0032 
    (0.0027) (0.0029) 
Dummies for generations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education variables 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Commune fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of communes 10,474 10,474 10,474 10,474 10,474 
Observations 5,506,513 5,506,513 5,506,513 5,506,513 5,506,513 
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Notes:  In (3), the specific religious dummies pertain to the household heads. In (4), the dummies pertain to the 
density of specific religious individuals within the same household. Education variables include average 
household education among those aged 18 and above and its squared value. 
  
41 
TABLE 2. ORDINARY LEAST SQUARE ESTIMATIONS AMONG COMMUNES 
 
All Buddhism Catholicism Protestantism Islam Caodaism Hoahaoism 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) 
Spec. A        
Follower density 0.0060*** 0.0076*** –0.0661*** –0.0216 0.0614 0.0232 0.0039  
(0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0174) (0.0140) (0.0475) (0.0247) (0.0089) 
Serious follower density –0.0022 –0.0103 0.0700*** –0.0274 –0.0869 –0.0494 –0.0029  
(0.0023) (0.0096) (0.0176) (0.0345) (0.0807) (0.0453) (0.0144) 
R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.016 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 
Spec. B 
       
Serious follower ratio –0.0027*** –0.0041*** 0.0039** 0.0030** 0.0010 0.0003 0.0002 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0018) 
R-squared 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.010 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Number of communes 7,834 6,547 6,481 2,821 460 3,098 797 
Note: Education and Education^2 are included in all estimations and correspond to the sample selection. For example, they are all eligible people within the commune for (1) 
but are of followers of Buddhism for (2). 
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TABLE 3. INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE (IV) ESTIMATIONS AMONG COMMUNES 
 Spec. A   Spec. B   
 All Buddhism Catholicism All Buddhism Catholicism 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 VARIABLES Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) 
Follower density 0.0589*** 0.0510*** 2.3059***    
 
(0.0181) (0.0162) (0.7244)    
Serious follower density –0.0981** –0.1923** –2.2988***    
 
(0.0436) (0.0932) (0.7232)    
Serious follower ratio    –0.0176*** –0.0095*** 0.0031 
    (0.0036) (0.0027) (0.0096) 
Number of communes 7,834 6,547 6,481 7,834 6,547 6,481 
R-squared –0.257 –0.112 –1.439 –0.043 –0.003 0.002 
Under-identification test       
 Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 16.276 47.818 57.492 347.599 450.985 452.204 
Chi-sq(2) P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification test       
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 5.210 22.911 17.964 102.241 152.6999 132.041 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical 
values: 10% maximal IV size 
 
13.43 
 
13.43 
 
13.43 
 
22.30 
 
22.30 
 
22.30 
Hansen J Statistic 0.382 0.082 1.005 0.969 3.624 14.236 
Chi-sq(1) P-value 0.5363 0.7745 0.3160 0.6160 0.1633 0.0008 
Notes: All communes of Quang Tri province were excluded. Two-step generalized method of moments and 
robust district clustered variance are used; the first step results are shown in Appendix 14. Similar to Table 2, 
Education and Education^2 are included in all estimations. LM=Lagrange multiplier; ID=identification.
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TABLE 4. PROBABILITY OF NON-BELIEVER HOUSEHOLDS HAVING A BOY 
AMONG COMMUNES  
 Six religions Buddhism  Catholicism  
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Prob(b2) Prob(b2) Prob(b2) Prob(b2) Prob(b2) Prob(b2) 
Spec. A       
Follower density 0.0103** 0.0456 0.0102*** 0.0476*** –0.0953 3.5797***  
(0.0040) (0.0419) (0.0035) (0.0167) (0.0624) (1.2254) 
Serious follower density –0.0078 –0.0633 –0.0245* –0.1751* 0.1097* –3.5656***  
(0.0096) (0.1025) (0.0137) (0.1036) (0.0636) (1.2251) 
Number of communes 7,831 7,831 6,547 6,547 6,480 6,480 
R-squared 0.003 –0.032 0.005 –0.063 0.011 –2.306 
Under-identification test       
 Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic  15.567  47.818  57.468 
 Chi-sq(2) P-Value  0.0004  0.0000  0.0000 
Weak identification test       
 Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic  5.021  22.911  17.950 
 Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical 
values: 10% maximal IV size   
  
13.43 
  
13.43 
  
13.43 
Hansen J Statistic  1.625  0.013  0.788 
 Chi-sq(1) P-value  0.0203  0.9109  0.3748 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Prob(b2) Prob(b2) Prob(b2) Prob(b2) Prob(b2) Prob(b2) 
Spec. B       
Serious follower ratio –0.0043** –0.0177*** –0.0044*** –0.0100*** 0.0052** 0.0227 
 (0.0017) (0.0061) (0.0008) (0.0032) (0.0020) (0.0187) 
Number of communes 7,831 7,831 6,547 6,547 6,480 6,480 
R-squared 0.001 –0.012 0.004 –0.002 0.001 –0.009 
Under-identification test       
 Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic  346.953  450.985  451.616 
 Chi-sq(2) P-Value  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Weak identification test       
 Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic  102.248  152.699  131.873 
 Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical 
values: 10% maximal IV size 
  
22.30 
  
22.30 
  
22.30 
Hansen J Statistic  1.434  2.031  12.791 
 Chi-sq(1) P-value  0.4882  0.3622  0.0017 
Note: OLS=ordinary least squares; IV=instrumental variable. The rest is the same as Table 3.
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TABLE 5. INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE (IV) APPROACH CONDITIONAL UPON 
FOLLOWER DENSITY (HIGH/LOW)  
 Six religions  Buddhism  Catholicism   
High Low High Low High Low  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) Prob(b) 
Serious follower ratio –0.0155*** –0.0187** –0.0130*** –0.0005 –0.0108 –0.0173  
(0.0044) (0.0091) (0.0046) (0.0041) (0.0239) (0.0237) 
Number of communes 3,917 3,917 3,274 3,273 3,244 3,237 
R-squared –0.038 –0.047 –0.007 0.001 –0.005 –0.023 
Under-identification test       
    Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 219.316 94.279 174.122 244.051 211.536 44.617 
    Chi-sq(2) P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification test       
    Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 73.179 25.064 78.597 124.394 63.106 24.323 
    Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical  
    values: 10% maximal IV size 
 
22.30 
 
22.30 
 
22.30 
 
22.30 
 
22.30 
 
22.30 
 Hansen J Statistic 0.018 2.267 0.161 4.146 6.110 8.101 
     Chi-sq(1) P-value 0.9911 0.3219 0.9227 0.1258 0.0471 0.0174 
       
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Prob(b2) Prob(b2) Prob(b2) Prob(b2) Prob(b2) Prob(b2) 
Serious follower ratio –0.0136 –0.0184** –0.0118** –0.0011 0.0110 –0.0150 
 (0.0090) (0.0092) (0.0056) (0.0041) (0.0490) (0.0236) 
Number of communes 3,914 3,917 3,274 3,273 3,243 3,237 
R-squared –0.002 –0.043 –0.002 0.002 0.003 –0.017 
Under-identification test       
    Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 218.595 94.279 174.122 244.051 211.219 44.617 
    Chi-sq(2) P-Value 0.0000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak identification test       
    Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 73.297 25.064 78.597 124.394 63.026 24.323 
    Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical  
    values: 10% maximal IV size 
 
22.30 
 
22.30 
 
22.30 
 
22.30 
 
22.30 
 
22.30 
 Hansen J Statistic 1.233 1.670 0.038 4.146 8.339 8.794 
     Chi-sq(1) P-value 0.5399 0.4338 0.9811 0.1258 0.0155 0.0123 
Notes: Low level is where the follower density is equal to or below 0.0765, 0.0386, and 0.0232 for the six 
religions, Buddhism, and Catholicism, respectively; this represents 50% of the total commune number. The rest 
is the same as Table 3. 
 
 
